The evolution of work choice legislation in Australia by Abbott, Keith et al.
	 	
	
 
This is the published version 
 
Abbott, Keith, Devey, Alaia, Hearn Mackinnon, Bruce, Morris, Leanne, Saville, 
Kerrie and Waddell, Dianne 2007, The evolution of work choice legislation in 
Australia, in Work choices: evolution or revolution, Heidelberg Press, 
Heidelberg, Vic., pp.1-22. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Available from Deakin Research Online 
 
http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30006916	
	
	
	
	
	
 
 
Reproduced with the kind permission of the copyright owner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright: 2007, Heidelberg Press 
 
Chapter 1 
The Evolution of Work Choice 
Legislation in Australia 
Keith Abbott, Alaia Devey, Bruce Hearn Mackinnon, Leanne Morris, 
Kerrie Saville and Di Waddell 
Deakin University, Australia 
Introduction 
The passing of the Work Choices reforms by the government-
controlled Senate in December 2005 represents the most jitndamental 
revolution in industrial relations since federation (Hall 2006, p.292). 
The 2005 amendments to the Workplace Relations Act 1996, known as Work 
Choices, came into effect in March 2006. Controversy has followed the legislation 
since its inception, and media coverage has been both extensive and partisan. 
Political sensibilities have resulted in a series of amendments to Work Choices, 
despite the legislation being only eighteen months old. As discussed below, 
although it still too soon for many of the economic ramifications of Work Choices 
to have been felt, such is the contentious nature of the legislation that Work 
Choices looks set to become the defining issue over which the 2007 
Commonwealth general election will be contested. 
In many ways, Work Choices reflects the long-held personal beliefs of Prime 
Minister John Howard, and indeed, some writers have questioned the justification 
for Work Choices given the relative health of the national economy and the state of 
industrial relations in Australia (O'Brien, Denniss & Burgess 2006). Underpinned 
by an ideological desire to minimize the influence of trade unions and the 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) (Ford 2006; McCullum 2006), 
decentralise and deregulate the industrial relations system in Australia, Work 
Choices has changed IR in six ways (Hall 2006): 
• Constitutionally, Work Choices alters the role of the Commonwealth from 
being based on the powers of conciliation and arbitration to that of 
corporations, 
• While existing awards remain until renegotiated between employers and 
employees, they have been organised to cover only 13 allowable matters and 
cannot be altered in the future. New awards cannot be created by the AIRC, 
• The procedure by which agreements are made between employers and 
employees or their representatives has, to an extent, been deregulated, with 
protection for workers through the No Disadvantage Test (NDT) being 
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replaced by safeguards in the form the five statutory minima that form the 
Australian Fair Pay Commission Standards (AFPCS), covering the minimum 
hourly wage, working week and basic annual- and sick-leave entitlements, 
• The power of the AIRC has been curtailed, sidelined from the arbitration 
process and with the Australian Fair Pay Commission having the power to set 
the minimum wage, 
• Union activities, and the rights of employees to take industrial action, are 
restricted under Work Choices, 
• Employee rights to contest what they see as unfair dismissal have also been 
curtailed, and removed altogether for workers of organisations with fewer than 
100 employees. A clear distinction is drawn between unlawful dismissal (based 
on race, gender, age, etc.) and unfair dismissal. 
One year on, the purpose of this paper is to survey the analysis that accompanied 
the introduction of Work Choices and present the findings of the research 
undertaken on the impact of the legislation. Specifically, the focus will be on 
assessing the impact of Work Choices on human resource management (HRM) in 
Australian organisations. Topics include the effect of Work Choices on the type, 
negotiation and content of workplace agreements; the impact of the legislation on 
employer-employee relations; and changes to the dismissal procedures in small and 
larger businesses. 
Assessing the Impact of Work Choices on Human 
Resource Management in Australia 
The most significant effects of Work Choices are not yet apparent, and may not be 
for at least another two years (Peetz 2007a, p.v). Indeed, in a survey by the 
Australian Institute of Management of its Victorian and Tasmanian membership in 
May-June, 2006, more than 60% of the 1,400 respondents admitted to having little 
or no understanding of the legislation (AIM 2006, pA). Perhaps related to this is 
the more recent finding that only 34% of small and medium enterprises (SMEs -
classified respectively as having workforces of fewer than 20, and 20 - 199) 
actually believe Federal Government policies to be supportive of small business 
(Sensis 2007, p.l8). Conversely, nearly a quarter believed the opposite, with the 
reasons most frequently given including the. belief that Government policy 
favoured larger organisations; and that the levels of bureaucracy and paperwork 
required were still excessive (Sensis 2007, p.lS). The latter finding is of interest 
given that one of the stated aims of the Work Choices legislation was to cut red 
tape, but also reflects, perhaps, the further changes to employers' record keeping 
obligations made through further amendments to Work Choices in June, 2006 and 
March, 2007 (Tobin 2007a). Thus, when asked specifically about the impact of 
Work Choices, only 21 % of respondents felt the legislation would have a positive 
impact, with 71 % believing it would have no real impact, and only one in eight 
stating that the legislation had stimulated them to make changes (Sensis 2007, 
p.20). 
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Having only been in effect since March, 2006, literature on impact of Work 
Choices on the human resource management practices of Australian organisations 
is limited, and falls into the following categories: 
• Reports by or for State Government bodies, such as the Inquiry into the 
Impact of Work Choices on Queensland Workplaces, Employees and 
Employers, by the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission (QIRC); 
and Assessing the Impact of ' Work Choices' - One Year On, by David 
Peetz under commission to the Victorian Department of Innovation, 
Industry and Regional Development (DIIRT), 
• Reports by other organisations, including unions and business associations 
such as the Australian Institute of Management, Sensis, the National 
Foundation for Australian Women, and the Australian Human Resources 
Institute (AHRI), 
• Books and journal articles, 
• Opinion polls conducted for newspapers, 
• Data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), 
• Articles and opinion pieces in newspapers and specialist magazines 
Work Choices in the Context of the Current 
Australian Labour Market 
It has been argued that as industrial relations legislation, Work Choices both 
reflects the international popularity of deregulation in market economies and labour 
law development in counties such as the UK, New Zealand, Canada and the United 
States (McCullum 2006, p.99). It was questioned whether Australia would embrace 
fully the neo-liberal ideology behind Work Choices or would seek greater 
egalitarianism through a return to the compulsory conciliation of the previous 
hundred years (McCullum 2006, p.l04). Further, it has been suggested that aspects 
of the Work Choices legislation might actually breach Australia's international 
legal obligations to protect the human rights of workers, most notably the 
Conventions of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) (Fenwick & Landau, 
2006, p.l28). Particular problems identified with Work Choices include the 
operation of A WAs; restrictions on the right to bargain collectively and to strike in 
support of such bargaining; and the lack of protection from unfair dismissal 
(Fenwick & Landau 2006, pp.128 and 135), both described in greater detail below. 
Further, attention has been drawn to the vulnerability of particular groups within 
the labour force, in particular women and indigenous workers (Fenwick & Landau 
2006, p.134): the argument that a tight labour market will protect workers from 
cuts in pay and conditions does not hold for all workers (Elton, Bailey, Baird, 
Charlesworth, Cooper, Ellem, Jefferson, Macdonald, Oliver, Pocock, Preston & 
Whitehouse 2007, p.8). 
In terms of the impact of Work Choices on job creation across the economy as a 
whole, the Government points to the figure of 276,000 new jobs in Australia in the 
twelve months to March, 2007 (Daily Telegraph 2006) resulting in an 
unemployment rate in March 2007 of just 4.5% (ABS 2006). However, of note is 
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that 230,000 new jobs were created in the year to November, 2005 - four months 
before the introduction of Work Choices - with the overall and long-term 
unemployment rates falling to 5.1% and 17.7% respectively (O'Brien et a1. 2006, 
p.309). The question as to the effect of Work Choices on job creation nationally 
remains, therefore, open to debate, particularly as the Reserve Bank of Australia 
forecast in November 2005 that labour conditions were likely to remain favourable 
given high levels of both vacancies and hiring intention (O'Brien et a1. 2006). 
Further, Ian Watson has argued that the employment rate is an overly simplistic 
measure of true employment that fails to include either hidden unemployment Of 
under-employment (Long 2007). More fundamental, however, is the assertion that, 
there is very little evidence supporting a linkage between changes in industrial 
relations arrangements and economic performance (O'Brien et a1. 2006, p.3ll; 
Stewart 2007, p.2). 
Nevertheless, increased flexibility in hiring workers given the limitation of unfair 
dismissal laws, coupled with the anticipated long-term decline in the real and 
relative wage of low paid workers, are seen as the means through which Work 
Choices will generate new jobs (O'Brien et a1. 2006, p.313). Further, it has been 
argued that the policy of creating a more flexible workforce, while benefiting 
business, has resulted in greater social inequality and insecurity - evidence of 
which is the fact that almost half of the worliforce is now employed on jobs that are 
temporary, part-time and/or onfixed contracts (Connell & Burgess 2006, p.493). 
Of interest given the current discussion on the economic impact of Work Choices 
are recent labour market trends in Australia and overseas. Domestically, 54% of the 
additional jobs created in 2005 were taken by women, the share of part-time 
positions increased and jobs growth was particularly high in retailing, property 
services, construction and mining (O'Brien et a1. 2006). Peetz anticipated, A WAs in 
industries and occupations with tight labour markets (such as mining) to be quite 
different to those in industries where labour has limited bargaining power (such as 
retailing and hospitality) (2007a, p.vi). 
Work Choices and Rates of Pay 
Prior to the introduction of Work Choices, several writers anticipated an increase in 
the number of low-paid jobs in Australia with the focus of new Australian 
Workplace Agreements (A WAs) being on the, managerial approach of boosting 
profitability through "cost reductions ", rather than productivity enhancement 
(Peetz, 2006, p.3). Owens suggested that Work Choices, significantly lowered the 
safety net with profound ramifications not only for workers who work under the 
minimum conditions of the safety net but for the vast majority of Australian 
workers given the changes to the process of negotiating agreements described 
below (2006, p.162). As a result of the diminished safety net, Briggs (2005) argued 
that as existing awards expire, employees lacking bargaining power would be 
offered no option but to accept individual A W As at the minimal levels specified by 
the AFPCS. La Jeunesse, Mitchell & Watts (2006) contended that even scrupulous 
employers might be forced to move towards minimum AFPCS conditions in order 
to remain competitive. It has been suggested that Work Choices, appears to 
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condone poor management and to encourage the provision of low quality jobs, 
with the resultant negative impact on the employment relationship actually being to 
the detriment of the business (Baird, Cooper & Oliver 2007, p.3), As a result, the 
fact that the Work Choices Act ... contains no measures to steer employers towards 
high-productivity strategies suggests that the Work Choices Act is doomed tofail to 
meet its own objectives (Fetter 2006, p.212). 
O'Brien et al (2006, p.312) contended that the primary objective of the AFPC 
would be to link any increases to the minimum wage to the economic impact. This, 
in addition to the argument that with short-term, Government-appointed 
membership, the AFPC would be less independent of Government economic policy 
than was the AIRC (Watts & Mitchell 2006), would mean that increases to the 
$12.75 minimum hourly wage would be both less frequent and less substantial, and 
that real wages for vulnerable, relatively high unemployment groups such as 
disabled and teenage workers, would in all likelihood fall. The Queensland 
Industrial Relations Commission (QIRC) commented that there is no obligation on 
the AFPC to conduct wage reviews annually or within any regularized time frame 
(QIRC 2007, p.26). It was also noted that casual workers would not be fully 
covered even by the minimum safety net of the AFPCS, including the 20% salary 
loading set by Work Choices (Owens 2006). 
Having been modelled on the Low Pay Commission in the UK, concerns have been 
expressed that employees will be able to circumvent the supposed minimum pay 
standards set by the AFPC with the result of effectively decreased pay rates 
(Owens 2006, p.173). Indeed, there is anecdotal evidence of employers failing to 
pass on to employees what increases the AFPC has made to the minimum wage, 
and even where employees are aware of being underpaid, they either,feel there is 
little scope for recourse or do not know the processes they could use to retrieve pay 
(Baird et al. 2007, p.20). 
Peetz (2007a, p.iv) has estimated that by the end of 2006, AWAs actually covered 
no more than four per cent of employees - representing an increase since Work 
Choices was introduced, but not yet a significant one. Nevertheless, Peetz argues 
that, the rate at which conditions are being removed is substantially higher under 
Work Choices A WAs than under pre-Work Choices A WAs, in particular overtime 
and penalty pay rates (2007a, p.v). 
Further, it was suggested prior to its introduction that the most significant shorter-
term impact of Work Choices would be employers taking advantage of the scope to 
increase working hours whilst simultaneously removing benefits to extract 
additional economic benefit from their existing workforce, rather than looking to 
hire new workers (O'Brien et al. 2006). At least one industry organisation has 
argued that Work Choices is an important tool to actually assist employers to 
control the wages bill and in many cases bring it down (QIRC 2007, p.40). More 
fully exploiting the potential of the exi.sting labour force was, it was argued, 
unlikely to result in either increased hiring or improved productivity (O'Brien et aL 
2006; Stewart 2007). With an apparent emphasis on increasing the number of low 
paid jobs, the cost minimization strategies by Work Choices appear to be inimical 
to longer-term workplace investment, including training (O'Brien et al. 2006, 
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p.3IS). It has been anticipated, however, that some larger employers, recognizing 
the importance of retaining valued employees, will continue to, make use of 
collective agreements and have appropriate ethical standards in reaching 
agreement with their work-forces (NFA W 2007, p.5). 
The Negotiation ofWorkpJace Agreements 
According to Riley & Sarina (2006), the most significant aspects of the legislation 
are amendments to both the procedural and substantive aspects of agreement 
making (2006, p.346), with the shift in power to the employer identified as being of 
particular significance to human resource management. Agreement-making at the 
level of the individual worker has proven to be perhaps the most contentious aspect 
of the Work Choices legislation, with speculation that the new legislation would 
allow employers to terminate existing workers and force them to return, or their 
replacements to commence, under individual agreements offering lower pay and 
worse conditions (Fetter 2006, p.216). Kelly (2006, p.8) argues that, Where awards 
and agreements are readily accessible and subject to public scrutiny, processes 
under the WC Act enable secrecy and hidden agendas and clauses. Nevertheless, 
industry groups such as the Restaurant and Caterers' Employers Association of 
Queensland have argued that W orkChoices is a far less intrusive form of workplace 
bargaining than its counterpart in the State system (QIRC 2007, p.39). 
Central to the power shift to employers during the process of negotiating 
agreements include: the removal of the requirement for employers to infonn 
employees of their right to union representation; the halving to seven days of the 
period in which employees have access to a new agreement before it is lodged and 
the removal of the obligation that employers explain the content of new agreements 
to employers; and the ability of new enterprises to lodge 12-month employer 
green fields agreements (EGAs) without first seeking the approval of workers 
(Riley & Sarina 2006, pp.346-347). It was noted that agreements negotiated 
between employers and unions had fallen from 85% of those certified in 1997 -
1998 to 73% to 2004 - 2005, and that this trend was likely to be accelerated by 
Work Choices (Forsyth & Sutherland 2006, p.186) despite - or perhaps because of 
- evidence that wage increases under union-negotiated agreements are greater than 
under non-union group agreements (Peetz, 2006, pA). Nevertheless, it is of interest 
that more than 40% of the CEOs and senior executives and managers surveyed by 
the Australian Institute of Management in mid-2006 also disagreed with the 
Workplace restrictions on unions (AIM 2006, p.12). 
Given that the legislation allows for employees to appoint non-union bargaining 
agents, it was speculated that Work Choices would result in the rise of professional 
agreement bargaining agents competing with the unions (Forsyth & Sutherland 
2006, p.188). In practice, employers might only be required to hold a single 
meeting with employers or their agents - union or non - to meet the negotiation 
requirements of Work Choices (Forsyth & Sutherland 2006, p.189). Under Work 
Choices it would be lawful for an employer to, simply elect not to engage any 
longer in bargaining with the trade union of which the workers are members 
(Fenwick & Landau 2006, p.138). 
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Such practice is in stark contrast to the strong emphasis under the New Zealand 
Employment Relations Act 2000 on good faith bargaining for collective 
agreements with the intent that both sides, approach the bargaining process 
seriously and with a commitment to entering into a genuine process of negotiation 
(ERA 2000, pA). Recent legal cases in New Zealand have focused attention on the 
need for employers to respect the relationship of a union with its members, with 
attempts by employers to circumvent a union by, negotiating, or attempting to 
negotiate, directly or indirectly with staff (Hannan 2007, p.l). 
With employers given the freedom to nominate individual A W As as the preferred 
form of agreement, the relative weakness of the negotiating power of employees -
and the willingness of many employees to accept lower pay and conditions rather 
than risk losing their job (Fetter 2006, p.2l1), the expectation was, therefore, that 
young and vulnerable workers might find themselves being pressured to sign 
agreements which they may not fully understand but which they may well feel they 
are not in a position to refuse (Owens 2006, p.181). This was particularly true 
given that the agreements would no longer be subject to the no disadvantage test 
(NDT) and which cannot be renegotiated for a period increased from three years to 
five (Fetter 2006, p.22l; Riley & Sarina, 2006, p.348). Many employees will be 
unaware of the need for, and unable to secure, their own protection during the 
agreement-making process (Owens 2006, p.18l). Thus, since earnings and hours 
outcomes of particular bargaining arrangements are governed by the degree of 
bargaining power held by employees (van Wanrooy, Oxenbridge, Buchanan and 
Jakubauskas 2007, p.vii), Work Choices has extended the reach of individual 
agreements beyond the realm of the common law contracts that have always 
existed for highly skilled, high demand employees with undoubted bargaining 
power, to workers who have always previously had the protection of an award or 
collective agreement. 
New employees may be forced to accept an A WA as a condition of employment, a 
strategy not deemed to be coercion since at the time of negotiation the worker had 
no relationship with the organisation (Fenwick & Landau 2006, p.135; Fetter 2006, 
p.2l4). Indeed, the Work Choices Act, provides explicitly that an employer cam 
lock out an employee in order to compel them to sign an A WA (Fenwick & 
Landau 2006, p.137). Union submissions to the South Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission confirm the, full use by employers of provisions of the WR 
Act providing that it is not duress if an employer requires an employee to sign an 
A W A as a condition of engagement (SAIRComm 2007, p.18). 
Once an existing agreement expires, both parties have the right to unilaterally 
terminate it. Ninety days after termination, if a replacement agreement has not been 
agreed upon, workers fall back under the basic AFPC standards. It has been noted 
that this clause of the legislation places workers under duress and places the 
employer in the position of being able to drive conditions down closer to the level 
of the AFPCS (Fenwick & Landau 2006, p.138). 
Further, with workplace agreements to be lodged with the Office of the 
Employment Advocate (OEA), and with the OEA not required to consider whether 
even the limited requirements of the legislation have been met with regard either to 
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due process having occurred in the development process or to the final content of 
the agreement, serious concerns must arise about the absence of meaningful 
protection of employees' interests under these new arrangements (Forsyth & 
Sutherland 2006, pp.IS9-190). In short, the effect of the reforms is to make it 
significantly easier for employers to pressure employees (whether legitimately or 
not) into signing away their rights, existing conditions and their capacity to be 
effectively represented by a trade union (Fetter 2006, p.210). Legal challenge to 
certified agreements in breach the requirements of Work Choices appeared to be 
the sole recourse of employees and their representatives (Forsyth & Sutherland 
2006, p.l91). 
One implication for HRM of the undermining by Work Choices of the structures 
and processes such as fair grievance procedures which are equitable for all parties 
is that resistance to a developing culture of workplace bullying will be hampered, 
whether from within and outside the organisation (Kelly 2006, p.9). Through the 
imbalance of power, the informalisation of employment relations in order to 
maximise employer flexibility and the restriction of employee voice, Work Choices 
evidently enables, rather than prevents, workplace bullying (Kelly 2006, p.l 0). 
Amongst low paid workers, research suggests a sense that, employers have access 
to increased managerial discretion and ability to hire and fire 'at will' (Baird et a1. 
2007, p.3). Nevertheless, recent research has found examples of workers actively 
seeking union representation in the negotiation process, in spite of, in one case, 
having received a letter from their employer stating their wish for a non-union 
agreement (Baird et a1. 2007, p.3S). However, many vulnerable employees 
perceive a shift in power to management - the rise and rise of managerial 
prerogative - with few of the workers interviewed able to identifY how this shift in 
power could be addressed (Baird et a1. 2007, pp.41-42). In short, Work Choices has 
created a climate where some employers feel licensed to act with unilateral disdain 
for workers and their rights (Elton & Pocock 2007, p.5), This change has been 
attributed in part to the perception that under Work Choices, much of the control 
and administration of the employment relationship can be moved from the public 
sphere - open to public scrutiny - to the private sphere where employment 
arrangements lie outside the purview of open scrutiny, and thus are less transparent 
(Kelly 2006, p.S). 
The Impact of Work Choices on Women 
In their discussions with more than SO low income employees, for example, 
Masterman-Smith and Elton found that an atmosphere of fear, vulnerability and 
confusion characterises the working lives of many low paid workers interviewed, 
affecting their morale, productivity and quality assurance at work (2007, p.3), 
Focusing on women, it was noted that, the challenges of meeting the multiple 
responsibilities of paid workforce participation and unpaid household 
responsibilities have a particularly important impact on women, who continue to 
perform a disproportionate amount of unpaid work within the Australian economy 
(WiSER 2006, p.iv). The need of many female employees to balance work and 
family life makes them vulnerable in the workforce, particularly with regard to the 
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individualistic process of negotiating an A W A, so that, the changes brought about 
by Work Choices had a demonstrable knock-on effect beyond the workplace (Baird 
et al. 2007, p.3). 
The National Foundation of Australian Women (NFA W) reports that only one third 
of young women feel confident to negotiate their own pay and conditions, and that 
80% would put up with poorer pay and conditions rather than quit and seek 
alternative employment (2007, pp.ll-12). Further, in their research on the impact 
of Work Choices on women, Baird et al found that, Not all of the women who were 
interviewed felt able to negotiate with management, and instead reluctantly 
accepted what management offered in order to get the job (2007, p.4I). For 
vulnerable groups such as young women, a major concern was the feeling of a loss 
of dignity and respect in what can be a secretive and divisive bargaining process in 
which success may depend on the type of self-promotion few vulnerable workers 
possess (NFAW 2007, p.16). 
As argued by Baird et aI, for low paid women, the new legislation has served only 
to diminish their options, at work, at home and in the community (2007, p.4). Two 
cases have recently been publicised in the media. In the first, a Wollongong 
restaurant faced prosecution by the Workplace Ombudsman over a range of 
violations of employee rights regarding A WAs after a young, female employee 
complained of not having had sufficient access to a draft A W A and that the 
proposed agreement neither stipulated her core working hours nor guaranteed her 
the minimum 20 hours of work per fortnight (The Age 2007). In the second, 
another young female worker was denied legitimate back pay, due to a provision in 
the federal Workplace Relations Act which states she was not eligible for back pay 
until she turns 21 (Duffy & Edwards 2007). 
Research indicates that, there are links between the size of the gender pay gap and 
particular wage setting arrangements (WiSER 2006, p.viii). Peetz (2006, p.8) 
draws on research from 2002 ~ 2--4, prior to the introduction of Work Choices, 
that shows that A W As were in fact the only type of agreement that resulting in a 
decline in average weekly earnings, in part the result of most A W As fixing wage 
levels for the duration of the agreement. Women appear to be especially worse off 
under individual A W As than under collective agreements, both in terms of hourly 
earnings and of the gender pay gap with men - a situation likely to deteriorate 
further under Work Choices (NFAW 2007, p.4). In fact, male, permanent, full-time 
employees were the only category of workers who appeared to be better off under 
individual A WAs than collective agreements (Peetz 2006, p.12). In contrast, the 
benefit to wages of a union agreement were greatest amongst part-time, female and 
casual employees (Peetz 2006, p.14). The concentration of A W As in particular 
industries has been noted (Evesson, Buchanan, Bamberry, Frino & Oliver 2007; 
Peetz 2007b). Drawing on pre-Work Choices statistics, three industries accounted 
for nearly half of all A W As approved in 2004-5: retail; accommodation, cafes and 
restaurants; and property and business services - and each of these industries has a 
highly feminised workforce (WiSER 2006, p.xii). It is not surprising, therefore, 
that nearly 60% of the female members of the AIM in Victoria and Tasmania 
surveyed in mid-2006 disagreed with the new AWA regime under Work Choices 
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(AIM 2006, p.ll). Transparent bargaining has been seen as central to efforts in 
pursuit of equal pay for women, and this is undermined by Work Choices (Elton & 
Pocock 2007, p.6). 
The Impact of Work Choices on Other Vulnerable 
Labour Groups 
Women are not the only sector of the labour market to be vulnerable to increased 
exploitation under Work Choices. The Queensland Industrial Relations 
Commission (QIRC) Inquiry expressed strong concern over the impact of Work 
Choices on young workers (QIRC 2007). By placing young workers in the position 
of having to independently bargain with their employers, Work Choices creates the 
situation in which the bargaining position between the parties will generally be 
unequal (QIRC 2007, p.8). Further, the South Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission received evidence on the negative impact of Work Choices on 
workers from two different Asian communities (SAIRComm 2007, p.34). 
Work Choices., Unions and Industrial Action 
Also of importance to the HRM ramifications of Work Choices on the process of 
negotiating agreements are the restrictions on the right of unions to initiate 
industrial action to strengthen a negotiation position and the fact that the AIRC can 
no longer intervene in disputes over agreements without the agreement of both 
sides (Sutherland 2005; Riley & Sarina 2006). The requirements to be met before 
employees are able to take industrial action with the protection of the law have 
been described as lengthy, onerous and restrictive (McCrystal 2006, p.198; 
SAIRComm 2007, pp.17-18). 
It is harder for employees to initiate protected industrial action, and more likely 
that any action taken will be deemed unlawful (McCrystal 2006, p.202). The right 
to strike legally is so restricted under Work Choices as to be described as being 
suppressed, despite the fact that even before the introduction of the legislation, 
working days lost to strikes were at the lowest level for nearly half a century 
(White 2006, p.66). For employers, Work Choices has narrowed the definition of 
industrial action to include lockouts of employees, purposefully excluding both the 
termination of employment or employer breach of a certified agreement 
(McCrystal 2006, p.200). 
It is noted also that in contrast to the complexity of the process demanded of 
employees before taking protected industrial action - involving compliance with 45 
sections of complex requirements (White 2006, p. 71), the ability of employers to 
initiate a lockout is subject to none of the same conditions (McCrystal 2006, 
p.204). For example, there is no requirement for directors or shareholders to be 
balloted prior to a lockout in the way that employees are required to be balloted 
prior to a strike (White 2006, p.72). 
Work Choices has also increased the financial burden on employees of taking 
industrial action. The legislation expressly prohibits an employer from paying an 
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employee in relation to periods of industrial action, whether protected or not 
(QIRC 2007, p.30), and, indeed, employers are required under to deduct at least 
four hours of pay from any employee who engages in industrial action for up to 
four hours - further heightening the financial impact on workers taking action for 
even the shortest period of time (McCrysta12006, p.202). 
While unions and other employee organisations are prohibited from taking 
industrial action in support of pattern, or industry-wide, bargaining, employers in 
national and industry associations are free to act together to pursue their interests 
(White 2006, p. 71). It was predicted that Work Choices might, by raising employer 
power well above the need to ensure a robust system of free and voluntary 
collective bargaining ... all but eliminate protected industrial action by employees 
in support of employee collective agreements (McCrystal 2006, p.20S). 
Further, it was suggested that the complexity of the procedural requirements of 
protected industrial action would result in more frequent legal challenge by 
employers to strikes in the hope of finding minor technical breaches that would 
render the action invalid (White 2006, p.72). Finally, the fact that under Work 
Choices the AIRC has the power to suspend protected industrial action where there 
is significant harm - such as economic loss - to third parties (White 2006, p. 73). It 
has been argued that all strikes are likely to have such an impact, and that this 
particular clause in the Work Choices legislation was aimed specifically at the 
caring professions such as nurses and teachers (White 2006, p.73). Recent 
examples of successful industrial action by employees are few. The South 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission refers to a strike by workers at Radio 
Rentals in 2006 which resulted in the employer backing down from its previous 
position of refusing to negotiate a new collective agreement (SAIRComm 2007, 
p.19). 
Figures released by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS 2007) show a 
dramatic decline in the three key indicators of industrial disputes for the year 
ending March 2007 compared to the year ending March 2006. Total disputes fell 
from 465 to just 136; the number of employees involved dropped from 242,000 to 
107,000 and the number of working days halved from 213,000 to 109,000. 
Focusing on the March quarter, 2007, and the manufacturing sector accounted for 
63% of the total working days lost (ABS 2007), while the greatest year on year 
falls came in the construction, transport and communications industries: down 86% 
(Davis 2007a). One example of industrial action within the manufacturing industry 
is AMWU workers at defence company Thales embarking on rolling stoppages 
over what the union describes as an aggressive campaign by management to 
introduce individual contracts with reduced conditions, despite employees being 
reported as having accepted lower pay in order to safeguard conditions (The 
Advertiser 2007). 
With no protection for industrial action taken during the term of an agreement, and 
responsibility for the enforcement of the conditions specified under the agreement 
resting primarily with the employer, scope for action by employees in the case of 
employer breaches of the agreement are severely limited (Fetter 2006, p.222). 
Under Work Choices, employees must either apply to the Federal Court for an 
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injunction and, in some cases, compensation, or complain to the Office of 
Workplaces Services - a body with just 200 inspectors to cover one million 
businesses nationally (Fetter 2006, p.223). One commentator has concluded that, 
the right to strike, in practical terms, is extinguished by Work Choices (White 
2006, p.76). 
Given the curtailing of the ability to take protected industrial action the question 
has been raised as to the future role of unions in industrial relations in an era of 
intensifying class conflict in which powerful corporations will intensifY their anti-
union campaigns (White 2006, p.77). Research by Baird et al found examples of 
such anti-union campaigns, including one example of workers organising meetings 
with union representatives outside working hours due to opposition by their 
employer to a union presence on site (2007, p.38). However, another interviewee 
stated that the inability of her union to offer effective assistance under Work 
Choices led her to cancel her membership (Baird et al. 2007, p.37). The South 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission also reports three examples of attempts 
by employers to exclude the Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union 
(LHMU) from representing employers in the bargaining process despite the union 
in question having been appointed the bargaining agent on behalf of many 
employees in negotiations with Aboriginal Hostels Limited, Prime One Services 
and Retirement Care Australia (SAIRComm 2007, pp.l9-20). 
The Queensland Industrial Relations Commission reports union concerns over the 
occupation health and safety impact of the Work Choices restrictions on union 
access to worksites, and employee reticence about raising occupation health and 
safety issues for fear of being tenllinated (QIRC 2007, pp.36-37). Further, QIRC 
itself expressed unease at the removal of health and safety training provisions from 
industrial instruments governing the employment of workers (2007, pAl). 
Work Choices and Unfair Dismissal 
The Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 provided for the first time at the federal 
level protection to employees from unfair dismissal. It was beholden on employers 
to justify termination in terms of the capability or conduct of employees, or of the 
operational requirements of the organisation (Robbins & Voll 2005, p.239). In the 
case of disputes, parties went to the AIRC for conciliation and arbitration. The 
Workplace Relations Act 1996, by introducing the fair go all round principle, 
made it easier for employers to defend unfair dismissal claims (Robbins & Voll 
2005, p.240). 
Between 1998 and 2003, successive Government ministers argued that the failure 
to exempt small businesses from the unfair dismissal laws was preventing the 
creation of anything between 50,000 - 75,000 new jobs, the result of small 
businesses being unable to fire unsuitable workers, and unwilling to hire new 
employees they could not later dismiss - although these estimates, and the notion 
of a relationship between unfair dismissal laws and employment inhibition has' 
been consistently been disputed (Robbins & Vo112005, pp.241-242). Whatever the 
accuracy of the claims, the fact that Work Choices defined a small business as one 
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with fewer than 100 employees - when in previous attempts to roll back the unfair 
dismissal legislation the limit was set at 20 workers - meant that the scope of the 
changes was substantially increased. Pittard (2006, p.228) cites 2004 figures that 
show that less than 5,000 businesses in Australia had workforces larger than 200, 
compared to more than 750,000 with 19 or fewer workers and just over 75,000 
with 20-199. 
Since the 100 limit was a head count, not full-time equivalent staff, employers with 
a higher proportion of full-time staff would more easily be able to remain under the 
threshold, and it was suggested that this would encourage the hiring of full-time 
rather than ongoing part-time staff (Pittard 2006, p.228). Where part-time staff 
were required, employers might choose to avoid adding to their head-count by 
employing short-tern1 casual or contract staff (Pittard 2006, p.229). 
Of note is that unincorporated businesses - including many small businesses - have 
always been exempt from the national unfair dismissal laws (Robbins & Vo112005, 
p.243). Further, Ministerial assertions made in favour of releasing small business 
from the unfair dismissal laws, that the number of claims by employees was 
excessive, that AIRC proceedings were complex and that outcomes favoured 
workers, have also been disproved (Robbins & Voll 2005, pp.244-245). Research 
indicates that the low unionisation of the small business sector meant that even 
before Work Choices many terminated workers would have lacked the advice on 
their rights to even launch an unfair dismissal claim, and that even where 
successful, compensation through the AIRC was usually small (Robbins & Voll 
2002, 2004, cited in Robbins & Voll 2005, pp.246 - 247). 
Regarding the assertion by those in favour of Work Choices that previous unfair 
dismissal laws acted as a restriction on the willingness of small business to hire 
workers, research predating the new legislation was inconclusive, with, no 
consistent evidence linking unfair dismissal to a reluctance to hire in the small 
business sector, particularly as casual workers - an important labour group in the 
small business sector - were already excluded from existing unfair dismissal 
legislation before the introduction of Work Choices (O'Brien et a1. 2006, p.313). 
Other research of small businesses indicated unfair dismissal laws as being a factor 
in the hiring decisions of only five per cent of respondents - of greater concern to 
many of the small businesses surveyed was hiring and retaining suitably skilled 
staff (Robbins & Voll 2005, p.248), and more recent surveys of small and medium 
enterprises (SME) confirms this. 
The National Salary Survey of 218 small businesses (AIM 2007b), conducted in 
May, indicates that staff retention is still the most significant issue facing smaller 
organisations, with voluntary staff turnover up from 10.3% in the twelve months to 
May, 2006 to 13 .6% in the 2007 survey, despite average pay rises increasing over 
the same period from 4.8% to 5.0% - an average skewed by higher increases in 
Queensland and W A. Further, the Sensis Business Index for Small and Medium 
Enterprises also (2007, p.IO) found that finding and keeping staff was the single 
greatest concern, far in excess of employment costs and regulations, and an 
increasing problem for SMEs (Sensis 2007, p.IO). The AIM report concludes that 
the competitive labour market has restricted the ability of small businesses to take 
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advantage of the Work Choices legislation to restrict such high wage rises (AIM 
2007). 
Given that the 100-limit includes workers to be terminated, employers would not 
be able to sack staff with the purpose of reducing their workforce to below the 
threshold (Pittard 2006, p.228). However, it was argued that the hiring implications 
of exempting small businesses from unfair dismissal laws would be limited by 
businesses seeking to keep their workforces under the 100 threshold specified 
under Work Choices (Robbins & Voller 2005, p.248). 
The exclusion of the right of employees in businesses of any size to file an 
application for unfair dismissal where dismissal was based on genuine operational 
reasons is one of the most significant and radical aspects of the Work Choices 
legislation (Pittard 2006, p.230). 'With the definition of operational reasons 
including economic in addition to technological and structural factors, and reasons 
rather than the previously used requirements, the question was raised as to whether 
Work Choices would allow employers to dismiss workers and replace them with 
cheaper labour (Pittard 2006, p.231). The legal outcome of one such case, 
Cruikshank v Priceline, failed to provide clarification (Tobin 2007b, p.6). In the 
case of Carter v Village Cinemas, a distinction was made by the AIRC in its 
decision in favour of the employer between the reason for tennination being real 
without having been valid or defensible (Creed 2007, pp.21-22). The South 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission cites several examples of employers 
exploiting what they see as an unfettered right to dismiss (SAIRComm 2007, p.30). 
The true limit of the definition of economic reasons would, it was argued, have to 
be set by the Federal courts (Pittard 2006, p.241). 
Given the ability of employers to dismiss workers based on operation reasons with 
immunity from unfair dismissal legislation, and the fact that groups of workers 
such as short-term casual and contract staff are expressly excluded from coverage 
by the legislation, the distinction between unfair and unlawful dismissal under 
Work Choices raised the question as to whether the removal of recourse by 
employees from small businesses to the former would result in increased claims of 
the latter (Riley & Sarina 2006; Pittard 2006; QIRC 2007). Further, while the 
standard probationary period of employment remains three months under Work 
Choices, employees are not covered by the unfair dismissal laws until the 
completion of six months employment (Pittard 2006, p.232). This qualifying period 
exemption has resulted in at least two legal cases through which it has been 
detennined 1) that a change of position by an employee within an organisation 
does not require a new six month qualifying period, but that 2) employment in the 
same position by a new employer, such as through the transmission of business, 
does leave employees in the vulnerable position of having to work through a new 
six month qualifying period (Tobin 2007, p.5). 
The final point raised with relation to the changes to unfair dismissal legislation 
under Work Choices is that with the return for many Australian workers to the 
situation that existed prior to the Termination Change and Redundancy case of 
1984, would employers once again seek added protection through their contracts of 
employment - even though this would in practice be limited to peripheral 
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safeguards such as demanding longer periods of notice (Pittard 2006, p.240). It was 
speculated that if future developments in contract law emphasised the notion of 
mutual trust and confidence, whether the number of contract cases brought by 
dismissed workers might increase (Pittard 2006, p.240). 
The issue of unfair dismissal appears to be the aspect of Work Choices causing 
employees the greatest anxiety, most notably the threat, or perceived threat of 
dismissal being used in conjunction with demands by employers for cuts in 
conditions (Peetz 2007a, p.vi). In their interviews with lower paid women, Baird et 
al. found that, a general sense of insecurity pervaded the responses from a number 
of interviewees, with all of the women now accepting they could be fired at any 
time (2007, p.33), evidence supported by data showing that women are 
overrepresented in complaints of unfair or unlawful tennination in Western 
Australia, with complaints being concentrated in the retail and hospitality 
industries (Creed 2007, p.14). The Western Australian Fair Employment Advocate, 
commenting on the growing trend for employers to see themselves as no longer 
obliged to afford the employee procedural fairness in terminating employment, 
noted that: 
By removing unfair dismissal protections for any employees, 
WorkChoices has effectively set a new standard for what is legally 
considered appropriate conduct by an employer in terminating an 
employee. (Creed 2007, p.21) 
Finally, the finding by the AIM that workers may actually avoid future 
employment with small businesses as a result of Work Choices (AIM 2006, p.21) 
is in clear contradiction to the rationale of the legislation that it would make it easer 
for small businesses to hire labour. 
Under the New Zealand Employment Relations Act 2000, employers are required 
to carry out a procedurally fair process before reaching a decision impacting on the 
continuing employment of an employee, with pre-emptive actions such as 
suspension or the stopping of pay being precluded (Hargreaves 2007). Recent 
decisions by the Employment Court have emphasised the obligations on the 
employer to: conduct a fair investigation and consider alternatives to dismissal; and 
communicate to the employee their rights to representation, to a reasonable period 
of time in which to consider their response to employer concerns and to the 
opportunity to comment on the employer's proposed decision prior to the outcome 
being confirmed (Hargreaves 2007). 
Work Choices, Flexible Working Conditions and the 
Fairness Test 
Of significance to employers is the fact that under Work Choices the standard 
working week is set at 38-hours, plus reasonable additional hours (Tobin 2007b, 
p.l), but that this is to be averaged over a period of up to one year. While this could 
allow significantly flexibility in favour of employees seeking to balance work with 
family and other responsibilities, it could also be exploited by employers 
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attempting to align production as efficiently as possible with fluctuating demand 
(Owens 2006, p.163), to the detriment of working parents seeking to maintain a 
regular schedule and a stable work-family balance (Fetter 2006, p.211; Masterman-
Smith & Elton 2007, p.5). The operating conditions of the organisation are also 
supposed to be balanced against the needs of employees in the process of 
ascertaining the number of additional reasonable hours allowed under Work 
Choices (Owens 2006, p.164). The result of these changes led writers to predict a 
greater likelihood of working unsocial hours, unpredictability of working hours 
(Owens, 2006, p.164; NFA W, 2007, pp.5-6) and fluctuating income (Fetter 2006, 
p.212). The averaging of working hours over a 12-month period also raised the 
possibility of employers being able to reduce overtime payments by balancing 
periods of additional hours with periods of under-time hours, with a net loss of 
income for workers but reduced labour costs for the organisation (Owens 2006, 
p.l65). 
It was noted that even before Work Choices came into effect, Qantas and other 
major employers signalled their intention to reduce allowances for overtime and 
shift-work in upcoming agreement negotiations (Forsyth & Sutherland 2006, 
p.191). Through interviews with low paid female employees in the retail, 
hospitality, and manufacturing industries, Baird et al present examples of the rapid 
loss of non-protected public holiday entitlements, soon after Work Choices 
commenced (2007, p.28). The most recent biennial ABS Employment, Earnings 
and Hours (EEH) Survey, was conducted in May 2006, prior to Work Choices 
making an impact. However, it found that although workers on individual A W As 
were receiving 9% more per week than those under collective agreements, they 
were working 13% longer hours to do so (Peetz 2007a, p.vii). However, female 
permanent full-time staff, permanent part-time workers, and casual workers were 
all worse off under pre-Work Choices AWAs. The next EEH Survey will be 
conducted in May 2008, nearly two years after the introduction of Work Choices. 
A second example of the increased flexibility in working arrangements possible 
under Work Choices relates to annual leave. Employers, may take account of the 
operational requirements of the business when deciding whether to approve leave 
requests (Owens 2006, p.l66). Work Choices allows the provision for employees 
to cash out up to half of their annual leave, and a study of retail and hospitality 
industry A WAs indicates that more than 80% include such a provision (Evesson et 
a1. 2007). Although employers are banned from exerting undue pressure on 
employees to cash out leave, doubts were raised as to how such a ban could be 
enforced in practice (Owens 2006, p.167). Further, examples have been presented 
of cases in which employers have resisted worker requests to take leave, including 
sick leave and family leave, to which they were entitled (Baird et a1. 2007, p.29). 
Vulnerable employees - particularly female workers in the retail and hospitality 
industries - were also perceived to be at risk of being forced to work on public 
holidays given that an employee refusing to work on such days now has to 
demonstrate reasonable grounds for so going (Owens 2006, p.170). 
Election year Government concern over public perceptions of deteriorating 
conditions for workers on individual contracts resulted in the introduction in May 
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2007 of a new Fairness Test under which employers are required to provide fair 
compensation to workers for the removal of conditions including overtime, public 
holiday and other penalty pay rates (Davis 2007b). The fairness test applies to 
workers on salaries up to $75,000 per year, and has been introduced alongside 
improved Government funding for workplace compliance agencies to conduct 
audits on behalf of the Workplace Ombudsman. The Minister for Workplace 
Relations has indicated that audits will concentrate initially on industries in which 
young workers are concentrated, again reflecting public concern over the impact of 
Work Choices on the most vulnerable groups of employees (Davis 2007b). 
However, concern has been voiced with regard to the Fairness Test not providing 
adequate compensation to workers for conditions lost under Work Choices 
(Evesson et al. 2007; Stewart 2007; Peetz 2007b). For low income women 
employees, for example, it has been anticipated that the Fairness Test will make 
little difference . . . in relation to dismissal, control over working time, and work 
and family flexibility (Elton et al. 2007, p.8). Fears have also been expressed that 
rulings by the ombudsmen of the Workplace Authority as to what actually 
constitutes fair compensation may be inconsistent, with the only formal recourse 
being for an employee to seek a review by the High Court (Gahan 2007; Stewart 
2007). The Government has also responded to the criticism that employees lack an 
understanding of their rights under Work Choices by requiring employers to 
distribute a Government fact sheet by the end of September 2007 (Schubert 2007). 
Nevertheless, the impact on the HRM practices of employers of the new Fairness 
Test is that it adds yet another layer of legal complexity to the creation of 
workplace agreements ~ requiring the Workplace Authority to produce a guide to 
the Fairness Test that runs to 42 pages (Tobin 2007b). 
It was noted that the provision under Work Choices of either party to unilaterally 
terminate an A W A with 90-days notice once the original expiry date had passed 
could allow employers take advantage of the fact that without a replacement 
agreement, conditions of employment would fall back to the bare minimums 
specified by the AFPCS - and that employees could then use these minimum 
conditions as the starting point for a new agreement (Forsyth & Sutherland 2006, 
p.194). Pushed to attempt to bargain even to retain the status quo, employees might 
then be forced to accept a relatively disadvantageous new agreement rather than 
continue to work at minimum conditions for the duration of a protracted bargaining 
process (Forsyth & Sutherland 2006, p.194; Fetter 2006, p.2IS; SAIRComm 2007, 
p.19). 
The Impact of Work Choices on Human Resource 
Management 
It was mentioned earlier that in surveys of small business prior to the introduction 
of Work Choices, the hiring and retention of skilled staff was seen as a more 
pressing issue than unfair dismissal. It has been argued that while Work Choices 
was written in the name of labour market competitiveness in a global economy, the 
focus of the legislation is on employee flexibility rather than investment in training 
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(Connell & Burgess 2006, p.494). With the decline in lifetime employment there is 
an increased onus on workers to remain competitive as they move between 
temporary positions as part of increasingly fragmented and unpredictable careers, 
but that the responsibility for the re-skilling required has fallen increasingly on the 
employee rather than the employer as the dominant strategy for many firms 
appears to be a low level of investment in training where temporary workers are 
concerned (Connell & Burgess 2006, pp.494 - 495). In terms of human resource 
management, this raises the question as to the extent to which organisations are 
taking a short-term, needs-based view of employment based around an increased 
reliance on temporary workers that both reduces labour costs and reduces employer 
obligations to workers in areas such as training (Connell & Burgess 2006, p.494). 
In short, to what extent is it the preference of employers to buy external skills on a 
short-term basis rather than invest -in making skills internally (Connell & Burgess 
2006, p.50 I)? Evidence of this labour without obligation has been provided by 
ABS statistics on declining opportunities for training amongst casual workers 
(cited in Connell & Burgess 2006, pA96). Industries at the centre of the current 
Australian economic boom such as construction and IT face skills shortages and 
make heavy use of temporary skilled workers to fill those shortages (Connell & 
Burgess 2006, pA94). 
Increasing reliance on temporary labour serves to increase the detachment of the 
workforce from the employer and reduced organisational identification (Connell & 
Burgess 2006, p.497), with the potential to outweigh some of the human resource 
management benefits of recruiting temporary workers, particularly through an 
agency, such as improved job-skills matching and reduced recruitment time and 
cost (Connell & Burgess 2006, p.502). 
It is argued that the increasingly temporary nature of employment is most 
damaging to young people who may no longer expect to follow a career ladder but 
face instead a number of short-term assignments with different organisations 
(Connell & Burgess 2006, pA98). Another link between the increased use of 
temporary workers and Work Choices is the suggestion that while organisations 
might choose to invest in specialist, high-level training, they are unlikely to do so 
for relatively low skilled positions. The result is that most workers relying on 
agencies for increasingly precarious employment are low skilled (Connell & 
Burgess 2006, p.500), the type of workers most vulnerable under Work Choices. 
Conclusion 
One year after the introduction of the legislation, it has been argued that the 
practical impact of Work Choices has, in contrast to the political impact, been 
limited. In his submission to the South Australian Industrial Relations Commission 
(SAIRComm), Stewart suggests three reasons for this: a) the complexity of the 
legislation has resulted in many human resource managers being preoccupied 
merely with understanding organisational obligations; b) a general disinclination . 
to make radical changes to employment relations, especially on the part of 
managers directly responsible for human resources or industrial relations; and c) 
fear of negative media exposure if radical changes are attempted (2007, p.3). 
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Indeed, in its submission to SAIRComm, the Australian Services Union (ASU) 
stated that: 
Far from providing a simpler system for employers and employees, our 
experience has been that it [Work Choices} has actually made the 
system far more complex and confusing for all involved and created a 
climate in which disputation is more rather than less likely 
(SAIRComm 2007, p.lO) 
The disincentives to engage in good faith bargaining had created delays in reaching 
agreements, delays to the detriment of both sides (SAIRComm 2007, p.17). 
However, while some commentators have argued that the prospects for longevity of 
a robust system of collective determination of workers' wages and employment 
have never looked more bleak (Forsyth & Sutherland 2006, p.197), there have been 
recent media reports of organisations, public and private, abandoning attempts to 
negotiate AWAs in favour of a return to collective agreements with workers (ABC 
2007; Davis 2007c). 
A central theme in the research to date is the issue of increased insecurity at work, 
In short, Work Choices has made all employment more precarious (Owens 2006, 
p.182). Indeed, twelve of the twenty workers interviewed by Elton & Pocock, all 
from the retail, manufacturing and services industries, had lost their jobs with 
direct connections to Work Choices (2007, p.6). Rather than enhancing the direct 
employee/employer relationship as is one of the objectives of Work Choices, it 
appears from our interviews that Work Choices has created an environment . .. 
that undermines trust at work. There is no benefit to either party in the relationship 
(Baird et al. 2007, p.35), with the result that these changes raise serious doubts as 
to whether this new regulatory environment will achieve its objectives of 'higher 
productivity' and the creation of a fair labour market' (Riley & Sarina 2006, 
p.346). 
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